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Abstract 
Discourse on inclusion of immigrants in the European Union countries traditionally revolves around three core models: multiculturalism, 
assimilationism and differential incorporation. However, effectiveness of such classification is called in question due to dramatic transfor-
mations in economic, political, cultural priorities of receiving states. Competing stance of the European Union institutions (the European 
Commission) and of the nation-states influenced coordination and harmonization problems regarding responsibilities for integration of 
immigrants. Moreover, in order to ensure stability inside the receiving society, the member states started to introduce the so-called civic 
integration requirements which are criticized due to violation of immigrants’ fundamental rights.  The point of debate lies in the following: 
whether to select those immigrants who demonstrate compliance with values and identities of the receiving community? And secondly, 
should immigrant rights be sacrificed in the name of protecting national identity of the EU member states? Therefore, the present article 
aims at examining a complicated nature of regulating immigrant integration policies. It analyzes approaches to civic integration programs 
in different EU countries, and the way, how they fit into models of immigrant incorporation.  
Keywords: assimilation, civic integration, citizenship, European Union, models of inclusion, multiculturalism, residence permit, selec-
tion programs  
Introduction
Discourse on inclusion of immigrants in the European 
Union countries traditionally revolves around three core 
models: multiculturalism, assimilationism and differen-
tial incorporation (Favell, 1998; Brubaker, 1992; Foblets, 
M.-C.&Yanasmayan, Z. 2009). In the core of multicultural 
model or, in other words, multiculturalism lies respect for 
cultural diversity and state support for identity preserva-
tion of each immigrant community on its territory. Among 
the devoted followers are Sweden, the Netherlands and 
UK. In contrast, assimilationist model of immigrant in-
clusion (it is also referred to as republican or universalist) 
assigns central role to the principle of homogeneity. Park 
and Burgess define assimilation  in the following manner: 
“a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons 
and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes 
of other persons and groups, and, by sharing the experience 
and history, are incorporated with them in a common life” 
(Kostakoupolou, 2010, p.831). In other words, a foreigner 
has to fully assimilate into the receiving society, accepting 
commonly recognized identity and values. The classical 
example of such a model is France. The third model, which 
is called separational or model of differential incorpora-
tion, is characterized by restrictive immigrant legislation. 
In order to receive the residence permit, a third-country na-
tional has to satisfy a number of strict preconditions. In ad-
dition, immigration policy of those countries, which follow 
the separationist model, is directed at ensuring temporary 
character of immigrant’s residence and extremely compli-
cated way to naturalization. This type of policy is char-
acteristic of Germany, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland 
(Switzerland is the member of the Schengen zone only and 
not the EU). 
Functioning of the above mentioned models is based on 
two key points: firstly, the image of society they are look-
ing forward to build; secondly, the type of link between in-
tegration and immigration policy. The second point essen-
tially implies influence of internal integration strategies for 
foreigners on immigration policies of other member states 
of the European Union. As a result of transformations in 
economic, political, cultural priorities as well as resonance 
events, models of inclusion naturally exchange attributes. 
Indeed, approaches to immigrant incorporation are the 
result of combination between cultural globalization pro-
cesses and tug-of-war between inter-governmentalists and 
supranationalists inside the European Union. The financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 reinforced pessimist moods regarding 
deepening of unification processes inside the organization. 
Revision of effectiveness of the models and search for in-
spiration in countries, which became more successful in 
integrating immigrants, is being caused by confusion, and 
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in some cases disappointment, due to disparity between 
the chosen course of integration policies and its results. 
The point of debate lies in the following: whether to select 
those immigrants who demonstrate compliance with val-
ues and identities of the receiving community? And sec-
ondly, should immigrant rights be sacrificed in the name 
of protecting national identity of the EU member states?  
In this context, firstly, the present article sheds light at 
a complicated nature of regulating immigrant integration 
policies resulting from competition between the European 
Commission and nation-states. Secondly, I will analyze 
approaches to civic integration programs in different EU 
countries, and how they fit into models of immigrant in-
corporation.
Has Multiculturalism Failed?
Despite optimistic beliefs in multiculturalism’s firm 
future, turning blind eye to European New Right’s increas-
ing influence on changing public perceptions of hetero-
geneity and multicultural society is at least unreasonable. 
Party for Freedom in the Netherlands with charismatic 
Geert Wilders as its head, Marine Le Pen’s National Front 
in France, relatively young Freedom Party in Germany, 
Hungary’s Jobbik’s 16% in 2010 parliamentary elections 
point to public support for introducing selection mecha-
nisms for immigrants. Statistic data demonstrating increas-
ing gap between foreigners and locals in the standard of 
living, security threats, tensions between immigrants and 
representatives of local population in Spain, Netherlands 
and Italy serve for many as evidence for failure of immi-
grant integration. 
The book under the name “Germany Is Self-Destruct-
ing” by Thilo Sarrazin, member of Bundesbank Board of 
Directors;  ironical statements by German Chancellor An-
gela Merkel in address of  failure of “multiculti”; murder 
of the right-wing radical politician Pim Fortuyn and direc-
tor Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands; the 2006“ cartoon 
scandal” in Denmark; heated debates on construction of 
minarets in Switzerland; voting in the French Parliament 
in favor of wearing hijab in public places in summer 2010; 
introduction of ban on wearing hijab in 2004; and finally 
President Sarkozy’s call in May 2006 for regulated immi-
gration (immigration choisie) instead of illegal (immigra-
tion subie) are only a few examples of loud and resonance 
events which stir up the European countries in last years 
(Bennhold, K. 2006, p.A3).  
Notwithstanding pessimist moods regarding pros-
pects of immigrant integration, to Gary Freeman’s (1995) 
opinion, liberal democracies will strive for “expansionist 
and inclusive” immigration policies even under condi-
tions of negative attitude of masses (Freeman, G.P., 1995, 
pp.881-902). He argues that public opinion does not pos-
sess tools for powerful influence in comparison to highly 
organized lobby that gains profits from liberal immigration 
and integration policies. For instance, employers establish 
close links with those responsible for elaborating policy 
decisions and in this manner succeed behind the backs of 
the masses. Accordingly, immigration policies are free of 
moral consideration, it is nothing more than the result of 
lobbying by interested players of their own interests. In 
this respect, Stefan Jonsson’s (2012) concept of “precar-
iat” exposes, from the Marxist perspective, discriminative 
and exploitative nature of hiring migrants with residence 
permits of temporary character and gloomy prospects for 
receiving citizenship of the host country.
Between Two Fires: Who Stays in Charge for Immi-
grant Integration?
Existence of different models of immigrant incorpora-
tion influenced coordination and harmonization problems 
among member states on the supranational level. Indeed, 
it is impossible to ignore differences in transformation of 
the EU countries into receivers of immigrants:  if the “Old 
Europe” “enjoys” this experience for decades, the case of 
South European states offers a completely different per-
spective due to recent character of their transformation into 
immigration countries nearly two decades.  For the new 
EU members, it is even less. Since delegation of compe-
tences in the field of immigrant integration under common 
control of member states of the European Community in 
1991, supranational institutions, especially the European 
Commission, exercise more pressure on the receiving 
countries in order to obtain power in this field. The rea-
son lies in socio-economic origins of this organization and 
principle of free movement of people, goods, services and 
funds. In our case, the first element is of most interest – 
failure in integrating immigrants inside one of 27 members 
of the EU increases violability of other states. According 
to the provisions of the Schengen agreement, immigrant 
is entitled to free movement in the Schengen zone upon 
passing legalization procedure. Tensions arise due to lack 
of coordination between initiatives (it is especially true in 
case of Italy’s and Spain’s legalization campaigns) without 
consulting other member states.  
Spain deserves special attention in this regard, due to 
record number of six regularization campaigns for unau-
thorized immigrants just in twenty years. Two of them, the 
2000 and 2005 campaigns, caused serious concerns in the 
European Union, especially France and Germany. On June 
1st 1999, the number of illegal immigrants for mass regu-
larization in Catalonia alarmed the Spanish society: instead 
of forecasted 80-100 thousand, applications were received 
from 244 thousand illegals, of which 188 thousand was sat-
isfied. The 2005 campaign, when 700 thousand immigrants 
applied for documents and 578 thousand received them, 
provoked protest moods in other European countries, since 
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Spain serves as the departing point for most immigrants in 
search of job opportunities in richer West and North Euro-
pean countries (Kleiner-Liebau, p.92).  
From the point of view of the European Commis-
sion, unilateral actions complicate uneasy control of im-
migration by each of member states. That is the reason 
why common supervision of legalization measures in the 
framework of Justice, Freedom and Security area became 
the most important issue on the European Commission’s 
agenda. Eventually, in the context of free movement, prob-
ability of security threats for the EU became higher due to 
vulnerability of marginalized migrants to criminal organi-
zations, trafficking and smuggling networks. Fears grew in 
May 2011 when as a result of “the Arab Spring” in Tunisia 
refugees fled to Italy and France. Exactly during that time 
first calls emerged for cancellation of movement without 
passports at least for immigrants from Africa.
Above mentioned events gave impetus for deepening 
of competences in the sphere of immigrant integration and 
unification of the right to asylum, immigration and inte-
gration policies under one pillar. In accordance with the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, immigration issues were trans-
ferred from Home and Justice Affairs policy area to the 
European Community (The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). 
Hence, heads of member states expressed support for coop-
eration on all stages of immigration starting from its push-
ing factors, policies of issuance of entry permit, policies of 
integration and return (Tampere European Council, 1999; 
the Hague Programme, 2004) during the 1999 Tampere 
European Council and 2004 Hague European Council. 
Thereby, the European Union obtained competences 
in spheres which are vital for integration of immigrants; 
however, the privilege of taking final decisions still stays in 
the competence of member states. According to the conclu-
sions of the EU Council in Thessaloniki, key competences 
in setting forth and implementing integration policies are 
allocated by taking into account judicial, economic, so-
cial and cultural differences. Nevertheless, these policies 
must be elaborated by consulting other member states of 
the EU in compliance with the Common key principles of 
immigrant integration (Thessaloniki European Council, 
2003). As it was expected, they did not become obligatory 
and have only consultative character with the aim to assist 
member states in evaluating their own integration policies. 
At present, these principles laid fundament for exchange 
of experience between member states. Nevertheless, the 
European Commission does not abandon attempts to be 
actively involved in implementation of immigrant integra-
tion strategy by European governments. Of special interest 
is the 2005 Common framework for the integration of non-
EU nationals which views “basic knowledge of the host 
society’s language, history and institutions” as immigrant’s 
obligation and openly supports pre-departure integration 
measures and civic integration programs (Common frame-
work for the integration of non-EU nationals, 2005).
Definition of Civic Integration and its Dimensions
If integration is defined by the European Commission 
as “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation 
by all immigrants and residents of EU countries” (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005), the concept of civic integration 
is a more demanding alternative for its traditional concept. 
Its essence lies in the introduction of integration courses 
and orientation programs for the third-country nationals 
with the aim to prove knowledge of language, respect for 
values and symbols of the receiving society. In the opinion 
of Eva Moravska, Christian Joppke and Rainer Baubock 
(Bauböck, 1994), civic integration can be considered as a 
tool to solve controversial logic of contrasting assimilation 
and acculturation. Adjective “civic” demonstrates the re-
quired level of integration for deserving the right to reside 
in the country. Indeed, functional aspects of civic integra-
tion were transferred from citizenship prerequisites to im-
migration ones. In this manner, even if immigrants do not 
wish to refuse from their own identity and naturalize with 
the aim to become the ideal citizen of receiving state, they 
are obliged to observe a defined complex of values, tradi-
tions and principles in order to be considered legal (Car-
rera, 2009).  
Analyzing application of civic integration require-
ments in the immigrant legislation of the European Union, 
we can single out two dimensions – internal and external. 
Internal dimension is presented as programs, courses or 
contracts which are obligatory upon entering the territory 
of the state and receiving the right to reside. In this context, 
civic integration affects newcomers as well as candidates 
for receiving residence permit, including family reunifica-
tion. Likewise, the internal dimension of civic integration 
requires successful passing of programs and value exams 
for third-country nationals in order to avoid illegal and 
half-legal status. Internal dimension of civic integration 
stresses importance of access to social protection and se-
cured residence inside the country. One of the most influ-
ential sanctions for failing integration tests is non-renewal 
of residence permit and deportation. 
The external dimension of civic integration, or in other 
words, “integration abroad”, consists of evaluation and 
courses which are implemented by consular and diplomat-
ic institutions in immigrant’s sending state. The demand to 
start integration process goes beyond the borders of the re-
ceiving country, and civic integration tests turn into a tool 
of controlling and selecting potential immigrants. The es-
sence of external dimension of civic integration lies in de-
creasing number of entrances, particularly on the grounds 
of family reunification. For the receiving state, “civic inte-
gration abroad” serves as insurance sui generis before giv-
ing a third-country national permission for visa and right 
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to enter the EU. 
Consequently, integration is presented as additional 
criteria in internal as well as external dimensions on the 
way to legality of residence and guaranteed security for 
immigrants. It performs the function of state’s additional 
privilege to govern, restrict, and choose legal channels of 
immigration and those selected individuals, who will re-
ceive access to social insurance and solidarity. In spite of 
cultural integration, the essence of which lies in harmo-
nizing attitudes and behavior of immigrants with those of 
the locals, the aim of civic integration is not transforma-
tion of cultural belonging or assimilationist homogeneity. 
Its paramount task is support for immigrant’s functional 
autonomy together with his inclusion into the receiving so-
ciety, whereas the state receives guarantees from the nega-
tive consequences of immigrants’ isolation. According 
to the former Great Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
“civic integration aims to establish a respect for diversity 
that is maintained by commitments to common values” 
(Goodman, 2010, p.754). Namely with this aim, most Eu-
ropean countries put forward so-called demands of sys-
temic enhancement of civic integration, including integra-
tion agreements, courses, tests and ceremonies. It should 
be stressed, that willing to enhance immigrants’ inclusion 
into the receiving society is surely a positive development, 
however, demands which make certain legal status con-
ditional, may have negative consequences. If we analyze 
the way in which broadening of necessity of integration 
tests is taking place, the following pattern can be observed: 
citizenship – settlement – family reunification – entry into 
country. However, often the real rhetoric is hidden behind 
the intention of the state to encourage more effective inclu-
sion of newcomer into the receiving society and prevent 
his/her vulnerability. As compared with the obligation to 
respect and recognize «civic values»  for applicants for 
citizenship in the US and Canada, in its European version 
these prerequisites are obligatory even for those who plan 
to reside in the country for long-time or short-time period, 
and in some cases even for entering its territory. 
The key conflict line lies in the fact that the responsi-
bility for integration is frequently viewed as immigrant’s 
sole obligation, therefore, its result (whether successful 
or negative) is shifted to him too. Moreover, consent to 
integrate is turning into essential condition for becoming 
a full-fledged member of the receiving society. Potential 
immigrant has the following choice: either pass mandatory 
integration courses, or stay as marginalized member of the 
society with limited rights at best, at worst – he won’t even 
receive the right to enter the country in order to reside in it. 
Perception of immigrants by the receiving state as a burden 
is extremely dangerous due to attractiveness of this idea 
to the general public, especially its part, which sees the 
roots of increasing economic crisis, rising unemployment, 
financial stringency, necessity to pull the society’s belt and 
growing isolation by some ethnic groups in the presence 
of immigrants. It is necessary to recognize the fact that 
apart from getting benefits from the receiving state, mi-
grants invest their resources, first of all, labor force. In case 
of the Ukrainians in Portugal officials and high-ranking 
politicians constantly stress vitally important contribution 
of this group of immigrants to the Portuguese economic 
development, solving the problem of underqualification of 
locals and their low level of education.
Civic Integration Provisions in the EU Countries
Obligatory character of civic integration programs for 
obtaining citizenship and residence status in Germany or 
Denmark is not as striking as the unexpected surprise from 
the Netherlands, where the immigrant is not entitled to 
residence permit and social guarantees unless he passes in-
tegration exams.  From the other side, in France where in-
tegration courses, according to the logic of assimilationist 
model, have to be obligatory, they are voluntary. However, 
after the date of signing agreement to participate in integra-
tion courses their non-attendance may negatively influence 
decision regarding issuance of long-term residence permit 
(Goodman, 2010). The first law explicitly stating obliga-
tory character of civic integration was approved the 1998 
Newcomer Integration Act in the Netherlands followed 
by the 2005 Act on Integration Abroad and 2007 Integra-
tion Act (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p.834). The case of the 
Netherlands is evidence of the new vision of integration 
which overcomes its traditional understanding and starts 
not inside the receiving country but even before potential 
immigrant enters its territory. “Integration of immigrants 
abroad”, that implies refusal to enter the member state in 
case of unsatisfactory result in integration tests, is the most 
vivid example of the new trend to interdependence of state 
immigration policy and its integration programs. 
Scholarship on immigrant integration emphasizes its 
successful outcome for both sides, foreigners and the re-
ceiving state, is naturalization and in case of impossibility 
or unwillingness of receiving citizenship – permanent resi-
dence permit, which ensures all rights for immigrant apart 
from political ones and considered as citizens’ privilege in 
the European countries (exception is for the voting rights 
at local elections in some countries). Direct link between 
integration and citizenship acquisition can be observed in 
case of Great Britain. The 2002 Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act amended the previous one by entering into 
force on November 1st, 2005 (the UK Nationality, Immi-
gration and Asylum Act, 2002).  According to its provi-
sions, foreigner’s naturalization provides for sufficient 
knowledge of life in Great Britain and, in addition, com-
mand of English or Welsh, Irish and Scottish depending on 
the place of residence. It should be mentioned, that some 
countries experienced difficulties in linking citizenship and 
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integration from one side, and integration with immigra-
tion on the other side, which did not prove effective. 
The idea to introduce the integration tests in order to 
prevent isolation of certain immigrant communities inside 
the receiving state does not violate immigrant rights and 
the right to family reunification. However, difference is 
obvious in the case of the Netherlands, where passing the 
integration test costs over 4 000  €,  Austria, with the fee 
of 350 € for language tests, or UK, where the settlement 
test is free only for immigrants, who resided on its terri-
tory at least for five years, and for EEA nationals (Good-
man, 2010). 2009 Royal Assent of probationary citizen-
ship, which introduced the qualification period of five to 
eight years in order to receive the right to naturalisation, 
raised concerns from the European Commission on Hu-
man Rights and the Refugee Convention as well as various 
NGOs. Moreover, this Bill received neither the unanimous 
approval of House Lords, nor of the Home Affairs Select 
Committee in the House of Commons (Van Oers, 2010, 
pp.51-62).
By far the most successful laboratory of enhancing 
immigrant integration is Portugal, which occupies the 
second place in MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy In-
dex) after Sweden, leaving Canada, Finland and USA be-
hind. Regardless the fact that Portugal belongs to one of 
the least developed countries in the European Union and 
transformed into the receiver of immigrants around twenty 
years ago, its immigrant integration policies are recognized 
as the most progressive. According to republican (assimi-
lationist) model of inclusion, legislation on immigration 
and integration requires knowledge of country’s history, 
language and respect for core values. The immigrants 
are able to pass free of charge A2 language courses in the 
framework of “Portugues Para Todos” program, use the 
resources of CNAI centers, centers for immigrant entre-
preneurship in order to pass the procedures of requalifica-
tion (ACIDI, 2011).  As for Sweden, it is by far the only 
country in the European Union, which did not restrict any 
of the immigrant rights in the name of protecting its own 
national identity.
Conclusion
Taking into account all arguments mentioned above, 
integration of immigrants turned into one of the key prob-
lems for liberal democracies. In Europe and outside of it, 
concerns about “failure of integration” of relatively young 
immigrant communities and those with a long history of 
residence in the receiving state are on the rise. In states, 
where the “jus sanguinis” principle is in effect, immigrant 
is left with delusive hopes for naturalization, and full-
fledged membership in the receiving society. This leads, as 
in case of Germany, to situation when immigrant becomes 
interested only in improvement of its financial wellbeing, 
and necessity for interaction with members of the receiv-
ing country stays in the background. Without existence of 
enhancing policy of immigrant inclusion, their chances for 
voluntary integration become less likely, and inclination 
to isolation inside their own ethnic community becomes 
greater. From the other perspective, countries where “ius 
soli” principle is in effect are more motivated to foster in-
tegration of immigrants into the receiving society. How-
ever, multicultural model alone did not save them from 
the problems of countries with republican and differential 
incorporation models. It may seem paradoxical, but del-
egation of special rights to ethnic communities even more 
conserves their “separate status” in society. In their turn, 
those immigrants, who stay out of social links with their 
own ethnic group, experience difficulties in solving per-
sonal problems, since the ethnic community performs a 
protective function of safe harbor during immigrant’s first 
months in the receiving country.
In the light of foregoing discussion, we can single out 
three key dimensions, in which the concept of civic inte-
gration in the EU countries has transformed: vision of inte-
gration in each of the models of immigrant incorporation, 
relevance of mutual intersection of integration policies 
with immigration policies and, consequently, emergence 
of the new concept of “civic integration” for immigrants as 
well as “civic integration for immigrants abroad”. If previ-
ously pace of integration depended in higher degree on the 
will of immigrant to establish relations with the receiving 
society, new conceptualization of integration turned it into 
the form of agreement between immigrant (potential im-
migrant) and the state providing for the right to enter the 
country, legally reside in its territory, have a claim on social 
guarantees and immunity from exclusion and deportation. 
Finally, the European Union, which is looking forward to 
widening its competences in immigrant integration, plays 
the role of the third column apart from the immigrant and 
the receiving state. The questions remains open regarding 
violation of   fundamental principles of common immigra-
tion policies of the EU, particularly, immigrant’s right for 
family reunification. Besides, scholars, while researching 
the issue of civic integration, should consider its dual na-
ture, and be analytically precise in defining relation be-
tween civic integration, immigration policies and citizen-
ship.  
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